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Abstract: 
The proper implementation good corporate governance mechanisms in the company will increase the 
level of disclosure. The direct relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetry 
stated that the implementation of good corporate governance will lead to reduce information asymmetry. 
One of the most fundamental components to be considered in implementation of good corporate 
governance is the establishment of effective corporate hierarchy. The purposes of this study are to find 
out the effect of corporate governance structure on information asymmetry, to find out the effect of 
corporate governance structure on disclosure, and to find out the effect of disclosure on information 
asymmetry in Indonesia banking industry. This study used partial least square/ variance based statistical 
method, with descriptive analitical research method.  At significance level (α) of 10% resulted that 
corporate governance structure has a significant impact on disclosure in Indonesia banking industry 
(corporate governance structure represented by the indicator of audit committee member and independen 
board commissioner) and disclosure has a significant impact on information asymmetry in Indonesia 
banking industry (disclosure represented by the indicator of percentage corporate governance items 
disclosed or as IPCG). 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
The influence of growing globalization 
massively impact on investment.  Investors need to 
be convinced that the company where they 
invested has a standard corporate management and  
a good reporting standard also the correct 
implementation and monitoring in order to provide 
a return as expected by them. Transmission of 
relevant information on the actual events to the 
involved various parties in the organization 
(stakeholders) is very important in order to avoid 
information asymmetry. The collapse of Enron, 
Worldcom and some other global as well as local 
cases has proven the importance of the high quality 
of information in the company among 
stakeholders.  Disclosure of information is a 
fundamental principle in the system of good 
governance in the company, namely transparency. 
With a good corporate governance, it is expected 
that disclosure of relevant information will 
increase and will decrease the information 
asymmetry, especially among agent and principal. 
Agency theory states that the agency 
relationship arises when one person or more 
(principals) employs another person (the agent) to 
provide a service and then delegate decision-
making authority to agent. In the management of 
the company, often there is a separation between 
ownership and control between the owner as a 
principal and manager as agent. Agency 
relationship is a contract in which one or more 
principal (owners) use another person as agent 
(manager) to carry out the activities of the 
company (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The agency 
problem often occurs in managerial is "empire 
building" which refers to the tendency of managers 
to run the company beyond their optimal authority 
or to utilize/use resources in order to increase 
private utilities, power, compensation, and to 
increase their prestige (Jensen 1986). 
The contractual relationship between the 
various parties (stakeholders) in the company 
always happens in the business. And it is very 
possible impending problems, which is often 
called the agency problem, because of the diverse 
interests and because it allows the asymmetry 
information. In many cases, confidence in the 
management and reporting of the company was 
eroded. An increasing number of scandals or 
problems and the failure of companies to 
encourage the importance of implementing good 
corporate governance. The code of ethics is 
necessary, good governance approach will require 
the development of corporate performance 
comprehensively at all levels including revealing 
events (financial and non-financial) incurred so 
that the information received by the different 
parties are the same information or relatively 
similar. 
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In practice, disclosure can have a positive 
impact (gain) as well as negative (harmful). 
Disclosure can be used to convey the company's 
prospects in the future to shareholders but may 
decrease the competitive advantage of a company 
(Darrough, 1993). Disclosure in the investment 
world can act as publict relations for the company 
associated with the investment community at any 
time,  so through the public disclosure, investors 
know the existence of a company and reduces the 
risk of litigation costs for the company, but on the 
other hand there are costs to be incurred to make 
the disclosure, while those who take advantage of 
the disclosure typically do not want to pay because 
they assume that the company's financial 
statements are public goods (Elliot and Jacobson, 
1994). Disclosure may reduce the cost of equity 
capital. Disclosure can reduce information 
asymmetries in the capital market, and decreasing 
asymmetric information will directly reduce the 
cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997). Also that 
disclosure can improve the use of financial 
intermediation services, such as securities analysts 
services (Dahlan, 2003). The above descriptions 
explained that the study about disclosure becomes 
very important to do further. 
The aim of this study are to find out the effect 
of corporate governance structure on information 
asymmetry in Indonesia banking industry, to find 
out the effect of corporate governance structure on 
disclosure in Indonesia banking industry and to 
find out the effect of disclosure on information 
asymmetry in Indonesia banking industry. 
 
II. METHOD OF STUDY AND DATAS 
The method described in this study is 
descriptive research. Variables were identified, 
population and sample are the entire Indonesia 
bank companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Datas taken from published audited 
financial statements by an independent auditor for 
corporate governance variable structure, 
bloomberg bank data for information asymmetry 
and for disclosure. All datas are for the period of 
31 December 2001 to 2012. This study use partial 
least square regression approach (PLS) path 
analysis gives more openness in providing data 
processing requirements in the sense that the terms 
classical assumptions and certain distributions as 
ordinary least squares approach is no longer 
needed (Latan and Ghozali 2012, Jogianto 2009). 
A description of the operational variables of the 
study can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.  Description of Operational Variables 
Variables: Definition: Type 
of 
data: 
Corporate Governance Structure : 
 Managerial 
ownership 
The percentage of 
the number of 
shares in the 
company owned 
by managers, 
directors, and 
commissioners of 
all the outstanding 
share. 
Ratio 
 Institutional 
ownership 
The percentage of 
shares owned by 
all the institutions 
of the company's 
shareholders of all 
the outstanding 
share capital. 
Ratio 
 Audit 
committee 
member 
The number of 
audit committee 
members in the 
company. 
Ratio 
 Board 
independen 
Number of 
independent board 
members divided 
by all members of 
the commissioner. 
Ratio 
Diclosure: 
 Corporate 
governance 
disclosure 
Total score of 
items disclosed by 
the company / the 
maximum score 
that should be 
disclosed by the 
company (IPCG). 
Ratio 
Information Asymmetry: 
 Volume of 
transaction 
The number of 
shares traded on a 
particular day. 
Ratio 
 Bid-ask 
spread 
The average 
percentage of the 
daily bid-ask 
spread (the 
number of trading 
days) for each 
type of share 
studied during the 
observation 
period. 
Ratio 
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III. BASIC OF THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Agency relationship defined as a contractual in 
which one or more persons engage someone else 
to do something on behalf of those who delegated 
the authority for decision-making to the agent. 
Both sides have a relationship of utility 
maximization and the agent will not always act at 
the best interest of principal (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). 
In a contracting schematic of the modern 
corporation describes the relationship of each 
parties in the company, and the relationship 
between the parties describes the contractual 
relationship that allow for asymmetry information 
and can eventually lead to a conflict of interest 
resulting agency problems. Potential conflicts of 
interest abound, even in a group of owners or 
shareholders itself (Fred, 2003).  Developed 
corporate governance is as a system which directs 
all activities within the company can run properly 
in the interests of stakeholders. 
 
Good Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance concerns with the 
relationship between the management, board of 
directors, controlling shareholders, minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Australian 
Security Exchange states, Good Coorporate 
Governance as a system used to direct and manage 
the activities of the company. Corporate 
governance also have an influence in order to 
achieve optimal performance, to analyze and 
control the risks facing by the company (ASX, 
2005). Corporate governance is a system in which 
companies are directed and controlled, it also 
provides the structure that leads to the company's 
goals are already set, and the means to achieve 
those objectives and monitoring performance 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, OECD, 2004). 
In relation with the presence of board 
members, then the implementation of corporate 
governance is often linked to the size of the board, 
in some circumstances the board can be too small 
or too large, too small board member will lack of 
expertise or human power to run the company 
productively. While greater size will increase more 
skill and resources availabllity in the company's 
management (Lorsch and Maclver 1989; 
Goodstein at al., 1994). Study also found that a 
company with a larger board members will be 
better (Adams and Mehran 2005), despite another 
finding said that a small board would be more 
effective (Yermack 1996). However, that too large 
board size may not be efficient in making and 
implementing decisions, and also can be a waste of 
resources and reduces the productivity of 
individual. 
Another view in respect to board members said 
that an effective board should be balanced both 
within the company and outside the company. This 
ensures that the board remains independent and 
objective, maximizing the ability to make the best 
decision for the benefit of the corporation. It is 
expected that they will provide an independent 
assessment and monitoring for the better 
company's performance and that will raise the 
standard of corporate governance, yet said that 
board independent has positif relationship with 
corporate value  (Weisbach 1988; Byrd and 
Hickman 1992; Brickley at. al., 1994; Core at al., 
1999). 
 
Disclosure  
Management as a party to carry out company 
operational tasks has an obligation to meet the 
interests of shareholders, but on the other hand the 
management also have an interest to maximize 
their welfare. The difference of interests between 
parties that control company (management as an 
agent) with the shareholders (principal) would 
cause a conflict of interest (agency conflict). Agent 
who has more information about the current 
conditions and future plan of the company will not 
provide all the information to principal for various 
reasons such as cost constraints, a presentation of 
the report, and the desire to avoid the risk of visible 
weakness. On the other hand, principals need all 
the relevant information about the overall 
condition of the company, but do not have full 
access to the company internal information, it 
raises the asymmetry of information. Seeing the 
importance of information to minimize the 
asymmetry of information, disclosure of financial 
and non financial information is required. 
Disclosure of financial statements is a way to 
convey the information contained in the financial 
statements, which when talking about full 
disclosure principles that where management 
requires the disclosure of all the circumstances and 
events in the company that makes a difference for 
users of financial statements in making decisions 
(Hendriksen at al., 2002). Disclosure comprise of 
two types, namely: mandatory disclosure, it is the 
disclosure that must be presented by companies, 
especially for public companies. while voluntary 
disclosure is disclosure provided by the company 
outside of the items that are required to be drilled. 
This  disclose is the informations given to public 
about either financial or non-financial regarding 
  
                                            
283 
 
the firm's operations without any legal requirement 
(Dahlan, 2003). 
 
Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is a condition where 
there is an imbalance information between 
management as an information provider 
(preparer), with the shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Or a situation where there is 
inequality of information (both in quantity and in 
quality) owned between one party to another party. 
it is more often concerned that the information held 
by management as an agent is more complete than 
the information held by the shareholders 
(Ujiyantho, 2003; Muller, 2007). Therefore, as an 
agent it is their obligation to pass information 
about the current condition and the future plan of 
the company to the owner, those informations as 
signal, which can be done through disclosure of 
financial information (such as financial 
statements) and even non-financial (eq.  the change 
of leadership of the company). 
Agent in a position has more information 
capacity, the working environment and the 
company as a whole compared with the principal.  
Assuming that individuals act to maximize self-
interest, then with its asymmetry of information 
will encourage agents to conceal some principal’s 
unknown information. Asymmetry between 
management (agent) and the owner (principal) 
give an opportunity for managers to act 
opportunistically and unfavorable for the 
principals. 
 
Corporate Governance and Disclosure 
The main purpose of disclosure is to present 
necessary information in order to achieve the 
purpose of reporting, to serve the various parties 
who have interests that differ from one another. 
From the point of financial statements, the 
disclosure shall include the components of the 
financial statements, notes to the financial 
statements and supplementary information. 
Corporate governance is the set of 
mechanisms that are built to provide protection for 
the stakeholders, including the minority party in 
the company (outside inverstors and minority 
shareholders) from misuse of information delivery 
conducted by the managers as agent and the 
controlling shareholders (insiders). For companies 
that implement good corporate governance should 
adopt the principles of transparency, which in the 
sense of providing information to various parties 
in a timely, accurate, clear, comparable, adequate 
and easily accessible by the user. 
From another side, the application of corporate 
governance must provide appropriate incentives 
for management and board in order to achieve the 
interests of the company and shareholders and 
should facilitate effective monitoring. An effective 
corporate governance system in the companies and 
the economy as a whole will help provide a level 
of trust that is needed for a functioning of market 
economy. Good corporate governance mechanism 
can increase the level of disclosure in the company 
and the level of confidence in investing (Zaluki 
and Hussin, 2009; Wijaya, 2009; Susiyani, 2009). 
 
Corporate Governance and Information 
Asymmetry 
In order to reduce management actions that are 
beneficial for him/ her-self then it is important to 
implement corporate governance, which include 
controls and good procedures to ensure that 
management actions are in accordance with the 
interests of shareholders. Corporate governance 
mechanism can also affect the information 
disclosed by management to the shareholders. The 
implementation of proper corporate governance 
mechanism makes the management less likely  acts 
in the interests of their own, further also will be 
able to disclose relevant information and avoid 
delivery of inferior information to shareholders. 
Quality of information increased after 
implementation of the corporate governance code 
code (Machuga and Teitel 2007). Companies that 
face the information asymmetry will tend to use 
less intensive monitoring board and will be more 
lean on/ believe in the market discipline and CEO 
incentive compensation (Cai at al., 2008). 
In the previous study indicated when the board 
act more effectively in monitoring will improve 
the quality and frequency of information released 
by management. the publication or issuance of 
such information does not only include the actual 
reported earnings, but also in the form of voluntary 
disclosures such as management estimates and 
other information release.  Further shown, in 
addition to reducing the accuracy of personal 
information with the accuracy of public 
information, the disclosure will also reduce the 
cost to search information. This suggests that the 
existance of information asymmetry will be lower 
in the company whose board members work 
effectively. 
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Table 2. 
Studies Associated with Corporate 
Governance, Disclosure and Information 
Asymmetry 
# Resea
rcher, 
(Year
) 
Title Finding 
(s) 
Notes 
A Corporate Governance and Disclosure: 
1 Zaluki 
and  
Hussi
n, 
(2009) 
Corporate 
Governanc
e and the 
Quality of 
Financial 
Informatio
n 
Disclosure 
Effective 
corporate 
governanc
e 
positively 
related on 
financial 
disclosure, 
it was 
seen from 
the 
accuracy 
of the 
IPO. 
Quality of 
financial 
informatio
n 
disclosure 
proxied by 
the 
accuracy 
of 
manageme
nt 
earnings 
forecasts 
during 
IPO 
process. 
2 Wijay
a, 
(2009) 
Keberadaa
n 
Corporate 
Governanc
e dan 
Kondisi 
Financial 
Distressed 
terhadap 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Corporate 
Governan
ce and 
Financial 
Distress 
has 
significan 
impact on 
disclosure 
level. 
This study 
more 
looking at 
voluntary 
disclosure 
than 
mandatory 
disclosure. 
3 Anyta, 
(2011) 
Analisis 
Pengaruh 
Mekanisme 
Corporate 
Governanc
e 
Terhadap 
Voluntary 
Corporate 
Governanc
e 
Disclosure 
Public 
ownership 
has a 
significant 
positive 
effect on 
voluntary 
corporate 
disclosure 
(while 
institution
al 
ownership
, the 
proportion 
of 
independe
nt 
directors 
Voluntary 
corporate 
disclosure 
system 
measured 
by 
weighting 
through 
11 
categories 
of the 34 
items. 
Then 
compiled 
34 
questioner 
that 
represent 
them, 
and 
independe
nt audit 
committee 
showed no 
significant 
effect on 
voluntary 
corporate 
disclosure
) 
distributed 
to 100 
responden
ts. 
4 Susiya
ni, 
(2009) 
Hubungan 
Corporate 
Governanc
e dan 
Pengungka
pan 
Informasi 
Pada 
Perusahaan 
yang 
Terdaftar 
Di Bursa 
Efek 
Indonesia 
Tahun 
2001-2007 
: pengujian 
Secara 
Simultan 
Corporate 
governanc
e indeks 
has a 
positive 
significant 
effect on 
disclosure 
index. 
The 
variables 
in this 
study 
comprise 
of 
corporate 
governanc
e 
perception 
index, 
disclosure 
index, 
regulatory
, 
institution
al 
ownership
, public 
ownership
, board of 
directors, 
audit 
committee 
and 
company 
size. 
5 Tsame
nyi at. 
al., 
(2007) 
Disclosure 
and 
Corporate 
Governanc
e in 
Developing 
Countries: 
Evidence 
from 
Ghana 
In the 
developin
g 
countries 
(including 
Ghana), 
the level 
of 
disclosure 
is low. 
ownership 
structure, 
dispersion 
of 
shareholdi
ng, and 
firm size 
Data 
processed 
over 22 
listed 
companies 
on the 
Ghana 
Stock 
Exchange 
have 
represente
d 95% 
Ghanaian 
market 
capitalizat
ion. 
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has a 
significant 
impact on 
disclosure. 
6 Okeah
alam, 
Charle
s C. 
(2004) 
Corporate 
Governanc
e and 
Disclosure 
in Africa: 
Issues and 
Challenges 
 
It was 
characteri
zed by 
extensive 
corporate 
(financial) 
sector 
failure in 
South-
East Asia. 
Those 
failures 
clearly 
because of 
the lack 
disclosure
s and 
corporate 
governanc
e. 
Corporate 
governanc
e and 
disclosure 
has a 
strong 
relationshi
p. 
Africa 
should be 
able to 
learn 
some 
lessons 
and 
perhaps 
leapfrog 
some of 
these 
experience
s. This 
will be 
only 
possible 
however if 
disclosure 
and 
corporate 
governanc
e in Africa 
is 
carrefully 
analyzed 
and 
implement
ed. 
7 Richar
d 
Pike, 
J.L. 
and 
Haniff
a, R. 
(2008)
. 
Intellectual 
Capital 
Disclosure 
and 
Corporate 
Governanc
e Structure 
in UK 
Firms. 
Results of 
the 
analysis 
based on 
the three 
measures 
of 
intellectua
l capital 
disclosure 
indicate 
significant 
associatio
n with all 
the 
governanc
e factors 
except for 
role 
duality. 
Corporate 
governanc
e factors: 
 In
dependen
t non-
executive 
directors 
 Sh
are 
concentra
tion 
 Si
ze of 
audit 
committe
e 
 Fr
equency 
of audit 
committe
e 
meetings. 
 C
ombined 
role of 
chairman 
and CEO. 
8 Aboag
ye-
Otche
re at 
al, 
(2012)
. 
Corporate 
Governanc
e and 
Disclosure 
Practices of 
Ghanaian 
Listed 
Companies 
Although 
there has 
been 
improvem
ent of 
disclosure 
practices 
over the 
years, the 
level of 
disclosure 
in Ghana 
was still in 
moderate. 
There was 
a positive 
relationshi
p between 
the 
presence 
of 
accountin
g/ finance 
expert(s) 
on the 
audit 
committee 
and 
corporate 
disclosure 
practices. 
 Audit 
committ
ee 
characte
ristics 
are as 
the 
governa
nce 
attribute
s. 
 The 
study 
follows 
the 
trinary 
procedur
e of 
Aksu 
and 
Kosedag 
and uses 
Standard 
& 
Poor’s 
T&D 
items in 
the 
construc
tion 
disclosu
re index 
B Corporate Governance and Information 
Asymmetry: 
1 Kanag
aretna
m  at 
al., 
(2007) 
Does Good 
Corporate 
Governanc
e Reduce 
Informatio
n 
Asymmetry 
Around 
Quarterly 
Earnings 
Announce
ments? 
Good 
corporate 
governanc
e 
mitigates 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y during 
quarterly 
earnings 
announce
ments. 
Changes 
in market 
liquidity 
around 
earnings 
announce
ment as a 
proxy for 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y. Board 
independe
nce, board 
structure 
and board 
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activity as 
indicators 
for corp. 
governanc
e. 
2 Cormi
er at 
al., 
(2010) 
Corporate 
Governanc
e and 
Informatio
n 
Asymmetry 
Between 
Managers 
and 
Investors 
Formal 
monitorin
g (size 
board and 
committee 
size) and 
the level 
of 
voluntary 
governanc
e 
disclosure 
can reduce 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y. 
To figure 
out 
governanc
e 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y between 
managers 
and 
investors 
3 Klein, 
(2002) 
Audit 
Committee, 
Board of 
Director 
Characteris
tics, and 
Earnings 
Manageme
nt 
An 
effective 
job of 
monitorin
g 
manageme
nt 
conducted 
by board 
will 
increase 
the quality 
and 
frequency 
of 
informatio
n released 
by 
manageme
nt, 
reducing 
the 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y. 
Corporate 
governanc
e 
mechanis
m proxied 
by Audit 
committee
, board of 
director 
Characteri
stic. 
4 Tarjo, 
(2010) 
Mekanisme 
Tata Kelola 
Korporat: 
Mampukah 
Menurunka
n Cost of 
Equity 
Corporate 
governanc
e 
mechanis
ms will 
reduce the 
informatio
Board 
compositi
on, audit 
committee 
and 
transparen
cy of 
Capital? n 
asymmetr
y between 
managers 
and 
owners. 
Thus the 
risks of 
investing 
in the 
company 
is 
decreased 
for 
corporate 
securities. 
informatio
n used as 
a 
measurem
ent of 
corporate 
governanc
e 
mechanis
ms. 
C Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: 
1 Leuz 
and 
Verre
cchia, 
(2000) 
The 
Economic 
Consequen
ces of 
Increased 
Disclosure 
The 
company's 
commitme
nt to 
increase 
the level 
of 
disclosure 
will 
reduce 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y 
componen
t  
Informatio
n 
asymmetr
y (proxied 
by bid-ask 
spread) 
and the 
behavior 
of of 
volume in 
the 
transactio
n can 
predict the 
direction 
of stocks 
trading. 
2 Cormi
er at 
al., 
(2008) 
Board of 
Directors 
Characteris
tics, 
Governanc
e 
Disclosure 
and 
Informatio
n 
Asymmetry 
between 
Managers 
and 
investors. 
Governan
ce 
disclosure  
contribute
s to reduce 
the stock 
market 
asymmetr
y 
particularl
y in the 
legally 
country on 
investor 
protection 
is high, 
such as 
Canada. 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
of 
Web-
based 
disclosure 
was 
obtained 
from the 
web site. 
Governan
ce 
disclosure 
is 
measured 
by 
indicators 
of United 
Nations 
Guidance 
on Good 
Practices 
in 
Corporate 
  
                                            
287 
 
corporate 
governanc
e will be 
seen as 
something 
credibled 
efforts in 
improving 
governanc
e. 
Governan
ce 
Disclosure
. 
3 Kim 
and 
Verre
cchia, 
(1994) 
Market 
Liquidity 
and 
Volume 
around 
Earnings 
Announce
ments 
Expanded 
disclosure 
mitigates 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y between 
managers 
and 
investors. 
Lebih 
banyak 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y 
ditemukan 
pada saat 
earning 
announce
ment dari 
pada saat 
non 
announce
ment. 
Informatio
n 
asymmetr
y ditandai 
dengan 
meningkat
nya spread 
bid-ask. 
4 Verre
cchia, 
(2001) 
Essays on 
Disclosure 
Declining 
of 
informatio
n 
asymmetr
y used as 
a tool to 
integrate 
market 
efficiency. 
various 
related 
research 
studies 
over 
disclosure. 
Sources: earlier studies 
 
Disclosure and Information Asymmetry  
Disclosure is an effort to minimize the 
information asymmetry in the company. Through 
submission of relevant and credible informations 
(financial and non-financial) to all parties will 
expect that the quality of information held by 
management as an agent will equal or relatively 
equal (its quality and quantity) compared with the 
information held by other parties (including 
investors and creditors). so that the various parties 
will be assisted in terms of speed and accuracy 
during their decision-making process (Cormier at 
al, 2008) and governance disclosure contributes in 
reducing the stock-market information asymmetry 
particularly in the country with legally high 
protection on investor such as Canada. 
Generally, disclosure is deemed entirely good 
and disclosure in large companies as part of efforts 
to reduce agency problems arise in the company. 
Indeed this opinion is not completely perfect, 
because at the better level of disclosure can also 
exacerbate the agency problem, this is because the 
costs incurred in the disclosure will also increase, 
including executive compensation and meeting 
expenses in connection with the disclosure. 
Further, pointed out that large companies will 
adopt strict disclosure rules than smaller firms, and 
firms with better disclosure would use a more 
capable power management (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2012). 
For more details, the relationships between 
variables can be seen in a form of matrix table that 
related to corporate governance, disclosure and 
information asymmetry (see table 2). Thus 
concluded that if companies carry out the 
principles and mechanisms of good corporate 
governance it will raise the level of disclosure 
(whether voluntary or mandatory) and will further 
decrease the information asymmetry. In the direct 
relationship between corporate governance and 
information asymmetry it says that companies that 
implement good corporate governance will 
mitigate information asymmetry. Based on the 
above literatures theories this study constructed 
hypotheses as: 
1. Corporate governance structure has a 
significant impact on information asymmetry in 
Indonesia banking industry. 
2. Corporate governance structure has a 
significant impact on disclosure in Indonesia 
banking industry. 
3. Disclosure has a significant impact on 
information asymmetry in Indonesia banking 
industry. 
 
IV. THE ANALYSIS 
There were 38 banks listed on the Jakarta stock 
exchange, during the the year of 2001-2012, there 
were 17 new bank entry in the listing on the Jakarta 
stock exchange and after 31 December 2001 there 
were 6 banks delisted during the period. So there 
are 15 banks as sample in this study, with the years 
of research 2001 up to 2012 then there were 180 
year observational datas.  
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Outer Model Test (Measurement Model) 
 
The first step outer model test in figure 1 
shown that the indicators managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership for variable corporate 
governance structure were not meet the validity 
criteria, also indicator volume for variabel 
information asymmetry were not meet the validity 
criteria, it was because of the entire loading factor 
for those indicators were below 0.7. By 
eliminating one by one indicator which does not 
meet the requirements (from the smallest and so 
on), then we obtained the final model that deserve 
to be continued (as it is in figure 2), where that the 
entire loading factor for each variable has been 
greater than 0.7. 
 
Figure 1. First Step Outer Model Test 
 
Source: PLS figure output 
 
Figure 2 has shown that there are two 
reflective indicators for variable corporate 
governance deserve to be further processed (ie 
indicator of the audit committee member and 
independent commissioner), while for information 
asymmetry variable represented by the indicator of 
bid ask spread, and for disclosure variable were 
represented by IPCG indicators (total score of 
items disclosed by the company / the maximum 
score that should be disclosed by the company).  
Figure 2.  Last Step Outer Model Test 
 
Source: PLS figure output 
With the value of average variance extracted 
and Cronbachs Alpha were > 0.5 (see also table 3) 
confirmed that the model was eligible to be 
processed further for statistical hypothesis testing. 
The value of R square are 0.024543 and 0.031944 
repectively for disclosure and information 
asymmetry that implied the model was weak. 
Table 3.  Overview Result 
 AVE 
Composi
te 
Reliabilit
y 
R 
Square 
Cronbac
hs Alpha 
Corp. 
Governan
ce 
0.755
6 
0.860504   0.684261 
Disclosur
e 
1.000
0 
1.000000 
0.02454
3 
1.000000 
Inf. 
Asymmetr
y 
1.000
0 
1.000000 
0.03194
4 
1.000000 
 Source: statistical PLS output 
 
Inner Model Test (Path Model) 
This hypothesis testing using significance 
level (α) of 10% and based on the rule of thumb 
inner evaluation models that the correlational 
between variables will be declared significant if 
the t-statistics > 1.65 (Latan and Ghozali 2012). 
Path testing models with PLS approach resulted 
that only two hypotheses were accepted, namely: 
Hypothesis 2   Corporate governance structure 
has a significant impact on disclosure in 
Indonesia banking industry (corporate 
governance structure represented by the 
indicator of audit committee member and 
independen board commissioner) 
Hypothesis 3   Disclosure has a significant 
impact on information asymmetry in 
Indonesia banking industry (disclosure 
represented by the indicator of percentage 
corporate governance items disclosed or as 
IPCG). 
Figure 3.   Inner Model Test
 
Source: PLS figure output 
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Table 4.  Path Coefficients 
 
Original 
Sample 
(O) 
Sample 
Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
Standard 
Error 
(STERR) 
T Stat. 
(O/STE) 
Hypotesis 
(Accepted/ 
Rejected) 
Corp 
Govern -> 
Disclosure 
0.15666 0.17107 0.083336 0.083336 1.879874 
Accepted 
Corp 
Govern.-> 
Inf 
Asymmetry 
0.02795 0.03264 0.103585 0.103585 0.269859 
Rejected 
Disclosure 
-> Inf 
Asymmetry 
0.17221 0.16804 0.100585 0.100585 1.712034 
Accepted 
Source: statistical PLS output 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND INTERPRETATION 
The transfer of authority from principals to 
executives through the board for the provision of 
trust management of funds that have been invested 
in the enterprise is a form of agency theory, and 
this theory even thrive in the company formed in 
the relationship between the various parties. On 
that authorization relationship may potentially the 
emergence of agency problems, so that the 
information held by the agent and the principal can 
be different at levels and quality, that condition 
known as information asymmetry.  That is why we 
need good corporate governance that will reduce 
such problem,  the implementation of the 
principles and mechanisms of good corporate 
governance can raise the level of disclosure and 
will further decrease the information asymmetry. 
The study results showed that the application 
of corporate governance in Indonesia banking 
industry has a significant impact on the level of 
disclosure, in this study corporate governance 
reflected by  independent of board commissioner 
and the audit committee member or size. The 
sufficient information disclosure in Indonesian 
banking industry is very important to provide 
guarantees for the investors and creditors that 
every money they put in the bank is safe and 
deliver the expected returns. The role of 
independent board commissioner to oversight or 
control and to run their advisory function became 
very determinant point, independent commissioner 
board that exercises their role and function will 
encourage and increase the level of good corporate 
governance disclosure (Zaluki and  Hussin, 2009; 
Richard and Haniffa, 2008). 
The audit committee roles to review and 
evaluate financial statements periodically based on 
the rules and principles applicable accounting, 
assessing the implementation and results of the 
audit, as well as dealing with internal control and 
corporate governance implementaion, directing 
the implementation of transparency and good 
disclosure practices. This study implies the size  of 
audit committee in Indonesia banking became 
important in enhancing or to deliver the 
implementation of transparency and to the level of 
good disclosure practices (Susiyani, 2009). 
Disclosure has a significant impact to 
minimize  information asymmetry in Indonesia 
banking, submission of relevant and credible 
information from management to stakeholders will 
deliver the quality of information available to other 
parties (including investors and creditors) so that 
the various parties may be assisted in their 
decision-making process (Cormier et al, 2008; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  
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